Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy (2001) John D. Huber
Charles R. Shipan
Madeleine Pfahler
American Journal of Political Science 45: 330-345* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy (2001) John D. Huber
Charles R. Shipan
Madeleine Pfahler
American Journal of Political Science 45: 330-345
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
Table of Contents
Research Question
Theoretical argument
Research design
Empirical Tests
Summary of results * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
I. Research Question
Bureaucracies create policies where legislatures have avoided enacting policies
Strategies for control: use of budget processes, ongoing oversight, statutory control (use of legislation to influence agency decisions)
Key question: When will legislators use legislative statutes? * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (1)
Legislators care about the policy actions taken by bureaucrats
political context
Agree Disagree
Incentive to detail legislation
Bargaining costs
Professional capacity
Nonstatutory opportunities * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (2) – Political Context
Incentive to constrain arises when there is a conflict of interest between the politician and the agent
Divided government has been the factor most commonly associated with conflict of interest
Executives (E) have a strong influence on the preferences and actions of leaders in executive agencies (A)
If legislature and executive are controlled by different parties, then legislature has a greater incentive to impose statutory control (SC)
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (3) Bargaining costs
There may be several institutional actors who have to approve legislation
The more difficult it is to come to an agreement, the higher the bargaining costs divided government
Two forms of divided government:
1) Unified Legislature (UL) 2) Divided legislature
* SQ A ≈ E UL (↑SC) SQ A ≈ E ≈ L1 L2 (↑SC) Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (4) Hyp. 1:
Statutory control should be greater under divided government than under unified government. In addition, given divided government, a unified legislature should produce more statutory control than a divided legislature * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (5) – Professional capacity Legislators must have the personal motivation and ability to write legislation that will constrain the agency
Opportunity costs
They must also have the expertise to give precise instructions to agencies high ability individuals
Hyp. 2:
When there is divided government, an increase in legislative professionalism will produce an increase in statutory control. The amount of statutory control will be greater under a unified legislature than under a divided legislature * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (6) – Nonstatutory opportunities Politicians may rely on other features of the political environment to enforce their policy preferences
opportunity to monitor and correct the actions of agents (e.g. legislative veto, public hearings)
Politicians have to decide whether to pay the cost of writing detailed statutes or to trust in a nonstatutory mean
Focus on legislative veto
Hyp. 3:
When unified legislatures can use alternative nonstatutory mechanisms to control agencies, they will be less likely to rely on statutory control * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
II. Theoretical argument (7) – Hypotheses Hyp. 1: Statutory control should be greater under divided government than under unified government. In addition, given divided government, a unified legislature should produce more statutory control than a divided legislature
Hyp. 2: When there is divided government, an increase in legislative professionalism will produce an increase in statutory control. The amount of statutory control will be greater under a unified legislature than under a divided legislature
Hyp. 3: When unified legislatures can use alternative nonstatutory mechanisms to control agencies, they will be less likely to rely on statutory control
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
III. Research Design (1) Institutional features Statutory Control
Enactment of Medicaid laws in 1995-96 in the American states
Medicaid: US health program for individuals and families with low incomes and resources
Why Medicaid?
All states have chosen to participate in the program, but each state is responsible for setting the details
Two exogenous shocks led to the need for action across the states (rising expenditures, failed attempt at national health-care reform)
Medicaid politics are extremely contentious
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
III. Research Design (2) Dependent variable: Statutory Control
Number of new words contained in all relevant legislation for the 1995-96 legislative process
Lexis‘s „Advanced Legislative Service“ database enables to identify which portions of a text were added
Conviction that more words imply more precise instructions to the agency, adn thus less discretion
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
III. Research Design (3) Independent variables:
Divided Legislature Dummy
Unified Legislature Dummy
Legislative Veto Dummy
Legislative capacity Amount of compensation paid to legislators per year
Control variables:
Medicaid expenditure
Unified-to-divided
Ranney Index
Bureaucratic professionalism
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
IV. Empirical Tests (1) * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
IV. Empirical Tests (2) * Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
V. Summary of results Bargaining costs, legislative capacity and nonstatutory opportunities influence the incentive/ability of legislators to implement statutory control of agencies
For any given level of compensation, the effect of Unified Legislature exceeds that of Divided legislature Hyp. 1 and Hyp. 2
Unified legilatures with legislative veto are less likely to impose statutory control on agencies Hyp. 3
* Ivo Krizic Delegation in the European Union 07/10/2008
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